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THE POWER OF LAWYERS*
John P. Heinz**
Lawyers are often said to be powerful, but what sort of power do
they have?
One thing we know is that a lot of them find their way into pub-
lic office. Tocqueville, who is enjoying a minor popular renaissance
at the moment, asserted:
The government of democracy is favorable to the political
power of lawyers; for when the wealthy, the noble, and the
prince are excluded from the government, the lawyers take
possession of it....
... As the lawyers form the only enlightened class whom
the people do not mistrust, they are naturally called upon to
occupy most of the public stations.1
* This Lecture was originally prepared for delivery on April 7, 1983, as a John A. Sibley
Lecture at the University of Georgia. I have drawn freely upon research that I have
conducted over the past several years in close collaboration with Edward Laumann,
Professor of Sociology at the University of Chicago. It is impossible to determine the origin
of each of the ideas expressed here, but there can be no doubt that much of my thinking on
this subject has been influenced by Laumann While I owe him a great debt, he should of
course not be held responsible for my conclusions and opinions. I am also indebted to my
colleagues John Flood, Robert Nelson, and Rayman Solomon, and to Michael Powell of the
University of North Carolina, all of whom read the manuscript and made helpful
suggestions.
** Professor of Law and Urban Affairs, Northwestern University, Executive Director,
American Bar Foundation; Washington University, A.B., 1958; Yale University, LL.B., 1962.
1 A. DE TocQuEv=ILx, DEMOCRACY IN AMIucA 275, 279 (IL Reeve trans. F. Bowen & P.
Bradley rev. ed. 1945).
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And beyond "public stations," lawyers are thought to exert great
influence through their roles as the trusted confidants of captains
of industry. This is the view of the lawyer as business advisor, sit-
ting at the elbow of the corporation executive and whispering in
his ear. No doubt this sometimes happens, but how often? And if
lawyers have power, what might be the sources of that power?
Classic theory about the nature of the professions, about what
distinguishes them from other occupations, has emphasized the
importance of the autonomy of the professional-that is, of the
control that he has over his work.2 The argument is quite straight-
forward, and it runs this way: What distinguishes professionals
from other, folks is that professionals have a great deal of special-
ized, arcane knowledge. Because their clients usually lack this spe-
cialized knowledge, the clients are unable to evaluate or to super-
vise the professional's work, and that gives the professional a great
deal of control in determining how to go about doing the work. The
unquestioning acceptance of "doctor's orders" is the usual ex-
ample.
A group of sociologists who have come to be known as the "func-
tionalist school"-the most prominent among whom is the late
Talcott Parsons3 -emphasize the social utility (or function) of this
professional autonomy. They suggest that, because the indepen-
dence of the professional is based on special knowledge or exper-
2 A note may be in order about the senses in which "power," "autonomy," "control," and
"influence" are used in this Article. Power is conceived here in terms of "the authoritative
allocation of values," in David Easton's phrase. See D. EASTON, THE POLITICAL SYSTEM 222
(1953); D. EASTON, A FRAMEWORK FOR POLITICAL ANALYSIS 50 (1965). One who has the au-
thority to allocate whatever is scarce and is valued by the society has power. "Authoritative"
means not only that one can make a decision but also that one can make it stick. The
denotation of "influence" is roughly the same as that of "power," though it may imply a
lesser degree. Similarly, "autonomy" and "control" are used here as rough equivalents. A
professional is said to enjoy autonomy to the extent that he has control of the work he does;
to the extent that the client controls the work, the professional lacks autonomy. Thus, if
one's work involves allocative decisions about resources that are scarce and valued, the au.
tonomy or control that permits one to make those decisions authoritatively constitutes
power or influence. There is a great deal more to be said on these issues, see, e.g., H. LAss.
wELL & A. KAPLm., PowS AND SOCIETY (1950); but I will not say it. Arthur Bentley ob.
served: "Who likes may snip verbal definitions in his old age, when his world has gone
crackly and dry." A. BNrrLEY, THE PROCESS OF GOVERNMENT 199 (1908).
3 See T. PARSONS, THE SoCIAL SYsTEM (1951) [hereinafter cited as THE SOCIAL SYSM];
T. PARSONS, The Professions and Social Structure, in EssAYs IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY, 34-
49 (rev. ed. 1954) [hereinafter cited as EssAYs]; T. PARSONS, Professions, in 12 INTERNA-
TIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SOCIAL SCIENCE 536-47 (D. Sills ed. 1968).
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tise that stands above or apart from the competing social, eco-
nomic, and pblitical bases of power in the society, professionals are
able to play a mediating or integrative role, serving to draw dispa-
rate elements together, to resolve conflicts among them, and thus
to preserve or enhance the functioning of the society. The profes-
sions are thus seen as a major stabilizing element of modem, spe-
cialized society, which otherwise might disintegrate through
centrifugal force. Furthermore, because of their autonomy, profes-
sionals are thought to be free to adhere to higher values, as embod-
ied in canons of professional ethics, and to embrace a sense of the
commonweal that transcends the boundaries of the profession.
Parsons argued that professionals are characterized by a "collectiv-
ity orientation."'4 And Justice Brandeis spoke of the lawyers' role
that he called "counsel for the situation."5 In this role the lawyer
seeks to bring disputing parties together and to achieve a "fair"
result; he does not pursue the client's narrow interest to the bitter
end by using every possible device that is provided by the law, per-
haps with results that are disastrous for all (except the lawyer).!
The independence that at least sometimes permits lawyers and
other professionals to pursue a broader, collectivity orientation
rather than narrow, special interests thus gives professionals a sort
of moral superiority. Furthermore, because their authority is based
in scientific knowledge or other expertise that is independent of
political ideology or social position, the influence of professionals is
thought to have greater legitimacy than does authority that derives
from more objectionable bases of power, such as guns or money. Or
so the argument goes.
But there is another, competing school of thought that disputes
this quite benign, rather complimentary view of the power of law-
yers and other professionals. This second school, usually referred
to as the "conflict" theorists, asserts that the power of profession-
als is based not so much in their special knowledge as in other,
more common bases of social power-money, at least, and perhaps
guns as well." In this view, occupational groups seek to achieve pro-
4 See THE SociAL SYSTEM, supra note 3, at 434-36.
5 See Frank, The Legal Ethics of Louis D. Brandeis, 17 STAN. L Rav. 683, 702, 708
(1965).
6 See Macaulay, Lawyers and Consumer Protection Laws, 14 LAw & Soci Ryv. 115, 125-
28 (1979).
7See, e.g., M. LRSON, THE RisE OF PROFESSIoNAIams A SOCIOLOG CAL ANA~xsis (1977); a
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fessional status because of the additional authority, deference, and
independence that that status will confer upon them. Magali Lar-
son has called this effort to achieve enhanced social standing "the
professional project."8 Varying occupations obviously meet with
varying degrees of success in this project, and the conflict school
would explain those differing outcomes by the extent to which each
of the occupational groups is able to mobilize underlying bases of
social power, including wealth, political or governmental authority,
and the like. From this perspective, then, professionals are viewed
as aligned with particular social or political interest groups. Be-
cause they are seen as less benign and more self-interested, they
are thus also seen as having less entitlement to moral superiority
or legitimacy and less ability to play a mediative role that binds
the society together.
These two views differ in their hypotheses about the sources of
professionals' power, then, but they agree that the power is real.
To the extent that the professional project succeeds (in the conflict
view), the professional acquires autonomy and power; to the extent
that the knowledge, skill, or rectitude of the professional is valued
in the society (in the functionalist view), the same result follows.
But, regardless of the nature of the process through which auton-
omy might be acquired, the more fundamental issue is whether or
how often professionals in fact enjoy autonomy or exercise power.
That is, if an occupation gains recognition as a profession, will the
members of that occupation necessarily or usually be able to exert
control over the work that they do? Does the fact that a society
values the professional's skills imply that he, or his profession act-
ing collectively, will wield important power?
In addressing this more fundamental issue, it is necessary to
note another distinction, one that is suggested by the phrasing of
the last question. An analysis of the power of lawyers might focus
on the relationships between individual lawyers and their clients
and seek to determine which parties control those relationships,
how often, and under what circumstances. In the alternative, the
analysis might focus on the legal profession as a whole, on organi-
FIEIDSON, PROFESSION OF MEDICINE: A SmY OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF APPLIED KNOWLEDGE
(1970); E. FREDSON, PROFESSIONAL DOMINANCE: THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF MEDICAL CARE
(1970).
1 See M. LARSON, supra note 7, at 104.
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zations of lawyers, or on lawyers as an actual or potential interest
group, 9 and then seek to assess the power of lawyers collectively
within the broader society. Just fifty years ago, Karl Llewellyn
made the distinction between the power of lawyers as individuals
(or, I think we might add, as individual firms) and the power of
lawyers as a profession. Llewellyn observed: "'The Bar' is in this
country an almost meaningless conglomeration. What we have is
lawyers, by their tens of thousands-individual lawyers without
unity of tradition, character, background, or objective; as single
persons, many of them powerful; as a guild, inert beyond easy un-
derstanding."10 I propose to discuss both the individuals and the
guild, but to consider first the relationships between individual
lawyers and their clients.
One might argue that it is foolish or illusory to try to analyze the
autonomy of lawyers in the lawyer-client relationship. After all,
one might say, if we look closely enough at anyone or at anyone's
work, we will find that he is not truly free. We are all constrained
by the persons with whom we deal. Thus, clients surely influence
lawyers, and lawyers certainly influence clients. But this is a very
crude, reductionist position. It ignores important differences in the
degree of influence flowing in each of the directions. For example,
professors are undoubtedly constrained by their students to some
extent, but probably not nearly so much as students are con-
strained by professors. The difference in the degree of influence of
each of these parties results from their relative control over the
certification of attainment (read, "grades"), a special form of social
power. In the master-servant relationship, it may well be true that
the servant exerts some influence on the master, but it is not
irrelevant to take note of which party is the servant and which the
master.
A more sophisticated objection to the analysis of control or au-
tonomy in the lawyer-client relationship argues that it is fallacious
to posit any set of characteristics or "traits" that distinguishes the
professions from other occupations. Proceeding from the conflict
perspective, this argument says that what is essential to being re-
garded as a professional is the possession of enough social power of
9 See D. TRUM, THE GovlNm1rAL Pi0cEss 34 (1951) (noting the possibility of identi-
fying potential as well as existing interest groups).
10 Llewellyn, The Bar Specializes-With What Results?, 167 ANNA 177, 178 (1933).
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some kind to be able to support a claim to professional status.
Thus, the claim to professionalism is a claim to elevated social
standing, a claim of entitlement to deference. 1  What distinguishes
the occupations that succeed in their claims from those that do not
is whether they can mobilize the resources necessary to induce
other groups to recognize the validity of their claims. Recognition
of a claim might in principle, then, be induced by wealth or intimi-
dation rather than by arcane knowledge or expertise. In this view,
autonomy might be an effect rather than a cause of professional
status. That is, autonomy might result from the occupation's suc-
cess in the "professional project"-from recognition of its claim to
professional standing-rather than the other way around. If auton-
omy is a product of recognition as a profession, then the extent to
which autonomy is exercised might be taken as a measure of the
degree of success in achieving such recognition.
But it seems clear that autonomy or control is not a necessary
nor a sufficient condition for recognition as a professional, and
neither is autonomy guaranteed by one's having achieved wide rec-
ognition of one's professional status. An occupation can enjoy a
great deal of autonomy and yet not be regarded as a profession.
Bartenders in skid-row saloons, for example, usually have consider-
able latitude in deciding whether or not to honor their customers'
wishes and in determining the level of craftsmanship to be applied
in their art (i.e., whether or not to water the booze), but their claim
to professionalism would not be taken seriously. The "mixologist"
is a joke. By comparison, the corporate lawyer who operates within
a narrowly delimited range of discretion enjoys high social stand-
ing and general recognition of the legitimacy of his claim to
professionalism.
But the critique of the "trait" theory of professionalism (that is,
of the attempt to define a set of inherent attributes that distin-
guishes the professions from other occupations), does not suggest
to me that the issue of professional autonomy is irrelevant. Auton-
omy may not define the "professions," whatever occupations these
may be thought to be, but it may nonetheless be of great interest
for what it tells us about the distribution of power in the society.
,1 See J. HEINZ & E. LAUMANN, CHICAGO LAwYERs: THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE BAR
84-90 (1982); E. Shils, Deference, in SOCIAL STRATIFICATION 104 (J. Jackson ed. 1968) (dis-
cussion of bases, characteristics, and distribution of deference in society).
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The issue of professional autonomy is an issue of who calls the
shots. If corporate lawyers do, in fact, exert substantial influence
over captains of industry, then they may have substantial effects
on the distribution of scarce resources, on the allocation of wealth.
If, however, lawyers are mere technicians, mere "hired guns," then
the values and decisions of the lawyers may not have much inde-
pendent influence on the distributive outcomes. The actions of
lawyers will still be a part of the process, of course, but those ac-
tions would be guided or directed by others, and the lawyers might
then be only agents for other interests, instrumentalities of their
clients.
It may well be that lawyers enjoy a large amount of discretion in
their work without having much effect on the distribution of
wealth. Lawyers are surely likely to have control of technical deci-
sions-such as whether to plead laches, whether to invoke rule
10(b)(5), or whether this is the best moment to take the deposition
of the company's president-and these decisions no doubt have
important consequences because some tactics will be more success-
ful than others. But I would like to put to one side the distributive
consequences that are produced by differences in the cleverness or
ingenuity of alternative tactics, or by other skill differences among
lawyers. 12 The relevant issue for an analysis of the power of law-
yers in the dyadic lawyer-client relationship is not whether lawyers
determine tactics or technique, but whether they modify their cli-
ents' goals or objectives. The distinction between goals and tactics
is nicely illustrated by the coal miner's monologue from the En-
glish revue Beyond the Fringe:
Of course it's quite interesting work, getting hold of lumps of
coal all day. It's quite interesting. You're given complete free-
dom to do what you like-your absolute free hand to do any-
thing you like, provided you get hold of two tons of coal every
day. But the method you do it, you can use any method open
to you. Hackin' and hewin' is the normal one. Some people
12 In the long run, the market pricing mechanism probably determines the allocation of
lawyers' skills. The more skillful lawyers-those with greater ingenuity, better judgment,
and superior persuasive powers, who will usually be more successful-will be likely to cost
more and thus to serve clients who are able to pay more. This tendency no doubt has impor-
tant distributive consequences. It is but one of the reasons why the outcomes of legal
processes will tend to favor parties with deep pockets over those with shallow ones.
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prefer the hackin', others the hewin'. Some people do the
combination. I'm a combination man myself. I do the hack
and hew, both .... Then there's scrabblin' at it with your
bare hands... And there's a myriad others. But hackin' and
hewin', as I say, it's quite a varied life you have down there.13
The issue, then, is whether the lawyer's freedom or autonomy is
like that of the coal miner or, in the alternative, whether lawyers
have sufficient authority or influence to modify the goals that are
presented to them by their clients.
Another observer of British social phenomena, Terence Johnson,
has developed a typology that may be useful in the analysis of this
issue. Johnson suggested that occupations might be classified ac-
cording to the allocation of power between the producer and the
consumer (in our case, between the lawyer and the client). He clas-
sified as "collegiate" occupations those in which "the producer de-
fines the needs of the consumer and the manner in which these
needs are catered for," and he called "patronage" occupations
those in which "the consumer defines his own needs and the man-
ner in which they are to be met."' 14
Now, which applies to the legal profession? Is it a collegiate oc-
cupation-which is the way we are accustomed to think about the
professions-where the "colleagues" within the profession have
sufficient autonomy to determine the manner in which the work is
to be done? Or is it a patronage occupation, where the clients call
the shots? Edward Laumann and I have recently published a book
in which we contend that part of the legal profession is of the col-
legiate type and part is a patronage occupation."5 I cannot begin to
present the argument here, but our basic contention is that the
lawyers who serve corporate clients constitute a separate and dis-
tinct segment of the profession, and that this segment tends to be
a patronage occupation, in Johnson's terms, while the lawyers who
serve persons tend to constitute a more collegiate occupation. If
one considers the nature of the clients in the corporate sector and
the relative amounts of their power vis-a-vis their lawyers, and
13 Monologue from Sitting on the Bench as performed by Peter Cook in the original
Broadway cast recording of Beyond the Fringe, Capitol Record No. W1792 (1962) (excerpt
transcribed from the recording by the author of this Article).
14 T. JOHNSON, PROFESSIONS AND PowER 45-46 (1972).
1" See J. HEINz & E. LAUMANN, supra note 11, at 360-65.
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then makes the same sort of calculation for the personal client sec-
tor of law practice, one will begin to discern the basis of our argu-
ment. The corporations that are the clients of corporate law spe-
cialists have vast wealth and social power; though their lawyers are
also wealthy, as lawyers go, and enjoy high social status, the power
of the corporate clients will outweigh that of their lawyers. The
lawyers are often dependent upon receiving repeat business from a
few, large corporate clients, and they will thus be reluctant to do
anything that would offend those clients. In the personal client
sector of law practice, the opposite tends to be the case. Though
some of the persons who are the clients in noncorporate legal prac-
tice are wealthy (undoubtedly, a disproportionate number of them
are, especially in fields of practice such as probate), the social
power of clients in the fields of law that deal primarily with per-
sonal problems more nearly approximates that of the lawyers
themselves. In some specialties within the personal client sector,
fields such as criminal law, civil rights, consumer work, divorce,
and personal injury plaintiffs' work, the clients include large num-
bers of persons of lower social status. In those areas of practice, the
lawyers will usually have higher socioeconomic standing than their
clients, and the clients will be much less sophisticated than are the
corporate clients, much less able to monitor or evaluate the per-
formance of their lawyers. Moreover, the personal client lawyers
will serve a much larger number of clients and will be much less
dependent upon receiving repeat business from any one of them.
They may, therefore, be more willing to act in ways that are con-
trary to a particular client's wishes. In short, in the personal client
sector the lawyers will be in a much stronger position to define the
clients' needs and to determine the manner in which those needs
will be met (Johnson's definition of a collegiate occupation). They
may well modify their clients' goals-as, for example, in determin-
ing the amount to be accepted in settlement of a personal injury
claim.' 6
On the other hand, though the lawyers who serve persons rather
than corporations may enjoy greater power vis-a-vis their clients,
they may be subject to extensive constraints imposed by other ac-
tors in the legal system. Thus, personal sector lawyers may be re-
quired to please judges, court clerks, insurance claims adjustors,
" See generally D. RosmEN.AL, LAwYER D CLmmr. WHO'S IN CHARGE:? (1974).
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bail bondsmen, and local bureaucrats. Overall, then, these lawyers
might well enjoy less freedom or autonomy in their work than do
the corporate lawyers.
If we are interested in the distribution of wealth, however, it is
surely in the corporate sector that the most important decisions
are made and that control is most consequential. Who does call the
shots in the corporate sector? How often do the lawyers give their
clients orders? Wilbert Moore recounts an anecdote about J.P.
Morgan and his lawyer. As Moore tells it, J.P. Morgan's lawyer
"commenting on a proposed business deal, remonstrated, 'But you
can't do that, Mr. Morgan.' Mr. Morgan, the story goes, replied,
'Your job is to tell me how to do what I want to do.' ,,17 Moore then
comments: "Mr. Morgan's attorney may have done so, but I do not
see the modern corporation lawyer so easily subdued. Within his
own field, and it is a tremendous territory, his word is literally
law. I8
Perhaps Wilbert Moore is right, but he offers no evidence that
the modem corporation lawyer is any the less subject to control by
his client than was J.P. Morgan's lawyer. One of the most impor-
tant developments in the corporate sector of law practice in recent
years has been the growth in the number of inside corporate coun-
sel-that is, house counsel rather than lawyers practicing in out-
side firms. At the very least, this development does not suggest the
increasing independence of lawyers in the corporate sector of prac-
tice. Indeed, the shift toward inside counsel reflects a desire by
corporation officers to exert a higher degree of control over their
lawyers. Inside counsel will not often bite the hand that feeds
them every day.
Much of the influence exercised by clients over their lawyers will
not be manifested in direct confrontation. It does not often come
to that. Rather, the lawyers will usually seek to anticipate the
things that are likely to rile their clients and will take steps to
avoid problems. Stewart Macaulay has given a good example:
[Lawyers position] themselves to serve those clients they are
likely to see and those who occasionally bring them cases they
prize. For example, a partner in a large Milwaukee law firm
17 W. MoORm, THE CONDUCT OF TM CORPORATION 185 (1962).
Is Id.
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decided that he could not be the campaign manager for a law
school classmate's race for Congress in the early 1960s. The
friend was a Democrat, and the law firm's major clients were
large family-controlled corporations locally famous for sup-
porting right-wing causes. The lawyer did not know and did
not ask whether these clients would object; even raising the
question carried more risk than he wanted to take.19
If this is typical, the political views and interests of lawyers' clients
may have a substantial chilling or channeling effect on the lawyers'
political activity (or lack thereof).
Indeed, we might even ask how often corporate lawyers see their
interests or values as in conflict with those of their clients. It may
be that corporate lawyers come to identify with their clients-with
their clients' interests, positions, values, and lifestyles--so fully
that the lawyers have difficulty in distinguishing their own inter-
ests from their clients' interests and seldom or never see a conflict
between the two. If this were the case (and I believe that it is),
then we would seldom find examples of real perceived conflicts be-
tween corporate lawyers and their clients and would have to look
instead for examples of "objective" conflicts between the two inter-
ests.20 That is, we would have to seek to identify situations where
it seems to us that the lawyers should see their interests as in con-
flict with those of their clients, and then to examine what took
place.
Let us consider an example. It is drawn from a new research pro-
ject on Washington law practice that some of my colleagues and I
are currently pursuing.2 In recent years airline rates and routes
have been almost completely deregulated, and there are a number
of lawyers in Washington who formerly made their livings doing
Civil Aeronautics Board cases full time (or nearly full time). Now
there is not enough such work around to permit those lawyers even
to keep their tank watches in repair. We interviewed a former CAB
19 Macaulay, supra note 6, at 163.
2I am not referring here to purely formal conflicts of interest or to conflicts between two
clients.
21 The Washington research is supported by the American Bar Foundation. The other
principal investigators are Edward Laumann, of the University of Chicago, Robert Nelson,
of the American Bar Foundation and Northwestern University, and Robert Salisbury, of
Washington University.
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specialist whose principal client had been a major airline, and we
asked him whether he had anticipated the effect on his practice of
the proposed deregulation and had taken any steps to oppose it.
He said that he had not. This lawyer had held high office in the
executive branch of the Federal Government, and he would have
been in a position to exercise some influence in opposition to de-
regulation if he had chosen to do so. When we interviewed him,
after deregulation, his practice had in fact fallen off substantially,
and he was looking for a new specialty and new clients. We also
asked him what his own thoughts or position had been on the de-
regulation proposal-that is, whether he had perceived the proba-
ble effect of deregulation on his practice and had thus realized that
there was or might be a conflict between his own interests and the
political position being pursued by his principal client. He said
that he had not really thought about the problem often; he had
been too busy practicing law before the CAB, and he simply as-
sumed that everything would turn out all right. It always had. In
short, he did not give much weight to the possibility that there
might be a real conflict between his interests and those of his cli-
ents. He largely identified with his clients' interests and seemed
reluctant to think of himself as in conflict with them.
My colleague at the American Bar Foundation, Robert Nelson, is
now completing a major study of large law firms in Chicago.2 As a
part of that research, he asked a random sample of lawyers practic-
ing in large firms this question: "Have you ever refused an assign-
ment or potential work because it was contrary to your personal
values? '23 Of the 222 lawyers questioned, only thirty-six (or six-
teen percent) had ever done so. Of those thirty-six, only a dozen
had done so more than once. 4 Nelson then further inquired about
the reasons for the refusals. Half had been based on reasonably
clear violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility (e.g.,
cases of continuing criminal activity). Most of the other half were
cases of the lawyer's disagreement on principle with the client's
See Nelson, Practice and Privilege: Social Change and the Structure of Large Law
Firms, 1981 AM. B. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 97. Nelson has recently completed a book-longth
manuscript based on the same study. See R. Nelson, Practice and Privilege: The Social
Organization of Large Law Firms ch. 8 (1983) (unpublished manuscript) (research in pro-
gress at the American Bar Foundation) [hereinafter cited as Practice and Privilege].
23 See Practice and Privilege, supra note 22, ch. 8.
24 Id.
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position (e.g., an unwillingness to defend racial discrimination or
serious environmental pollution).2 5 But of the eighty-four percent
of his respondents who had never found it necessary to refuse work
because it was contrary to their values, the vast majority said that
the reason they had never refused was that they had never been
presented with work that they perceived as posing a moral issue or
a conflict with their values.2 8 Of course, it is quite possible that
some large percentage of these lawyers may have had occasion to
admonish their corporate clients or to complain to them about
their behavior, and it is also possible that this may have had an
effect on the clients' conduct without the lawyer ever confronting
the necessity of withdrawing from representation. Within the lim-
its of Nelson's data, however, the evidence is that corporate law-
yers seldom feel that they need, for reasons of principle, to tell
their clients to take their business elsewhere.
To provide any reasonably definite answers to the questions
posed concerning the influence of lawyers on the goals of their cor-
porate clients and thus on the distribution of wealth, one would
need to have some measures of the nature of the relationships and
interactions between lawyers and clients, including indicia of law-
yer influence. Such measures might be obtained through direct ob-
servation, after-the-fact reports, or study of case files or other
records, but any observation of those interactions by a researcher
would of course raise difficult issues of client confidentiality. Law-
yers and clients who were dealing with sensitive matters might well
be reluctant to permit an outsider to look on." A researcher who
was licensed to practice law, however, or even one who was able to
work as a paralegal, might be able to conduct such research while
performing legal work for the client 2 8 The present scholarly litera-
15 Id.
26 Id. Only about eight percent of Nelson's respondents said that their personal values
should not be determinative or that, if they did not like the nature of the work, they should
resign from the firm. Id.
27 See Danet, Hoffman & Kermish, Obstacles to the Study of Lawyer-Client Interaction:
The Biography of a Failure, 14 LAw & Soc'y Rav. 905 (1980). Douglas Rosenthal did man.
age to address these issues of lawyer versus client control in personal injury cases, but the
greater power of lawyers vis-A-vis their clients in that context may well have made the law-
yers more comfortable with the research and have rendered the clients less able to object to
it. See D. ROsENmTu, supra note 16, at 172-76.
There does not appear to be any reason to suppose that such a researcher would be
more likely to breach client confidentiality than would another legal representative of the
1983] 903
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ture contains a great deal of speculation-some of it, mine-about
the extent of the autonomy and influence of lawyers, but a modi-
cum of systematic observation of lawyer-client relations would be
far more persuasive than that entire body of speculation. On the
present state of our knowledge, however, I do not find much evi-
dence that the lawyers who serve corporations enjoy a highly inde-
pendent, autonomous role, a role that would permit the lawyers'
own values (as distinct from those of their clients) to determine
the positions taken, with the lawyers thus having important, inde-
pendent effects on the allocation of scarce resources. In short, it
appears to me that corporate lawyers usually do their clients' bid-
ding, rather than the other way around. Maybe that is as it should
be. But, if so, where is the power of lawyers?
Perhaps we should return to Tocqueville's observation, noting
the great presence of lawyers in American politics, and inquire
whether that presence makes any difference. In order to make a
difference, in the sense of producing different outcomes or an allo-
cation of scarce goods that differs from the result that would occur
otherwise, it would be necessary for the lawyers who occupy public
roles to behave differently in them than do other citizens who oc-
cupy those same roles. Do they?
At least two studies were done by political scientists a couple of
decades ago on the behavior of lawyers in state legislatures. Heinz
Eulau and John Sprague, in Lawyers in Politics, present data sup-
porting their conclusion that the votes of lawyer legislators are es-
sentially indistinguishable from those of nonlawyers.29 Another
study, by David Derge, reaches very much this same conclu-
sion-that lawyers, at least in state legislatures, do not differ in
any substantive way from nonlawyer occupants of the same office.ao
Is there any good reason to doubt these findings? Lawyers might
be expected to represent client interests in their political activities,
client. Thus, I do not believe that either legal or research ethics would require the special
permission of the client as a precondition to such research.
As is always the case in "participant observation" research, however, there is a risk that
the researcher's role as a participant may compromise his objectivity as an observer.
29 H. EULAU & J. SPRAGUE, LAWYERS IN PoLrTIcs: A STUDY IN PROFESSIONAL CONVERGENCE
(1964).
30 See Derge, The Lawyer in the Indiana General Assembly, 6 MIDWEST J. POL. ScL 19,
21 (1962); Derge, The Lawyer as Decision-Maker in the American State Legislature, 21 J.
POL. 408, 427 (1959).
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but nonlawyer politicans also surely represent the interests of the
groups or factions who are their sponsors. These interest groups
may well be identical with the lawyers' clients. Again, then, the
available evidence appears to suggest that the power of lawyers,
such as it may be, does not produce identifiable distributive
consequences.
My tentative conclusion, then, is that the autonomy of lawyers
as individuals or as firms may be greatly overrated. But what of
the legal profession as a collectivity? Even if lawyers taken individ-
ually or as particular firms may not exert any great power that is
independent of their sponsors, perhaps the organizations of the
profession itself-particularly, the bar associations-might wield
substantial power. As the collective voices of an elite profession,
enjoying high social standing, they would seem to have great po-
tential for the exercise of influence. What, then, of the power of
the profession as a whole?
The first thing to note is that the profession is not a whole.
Rather, it consists of at least two, quite separate parts. In our
book, Chicago Lawyers, Laumann and I argue that there are two
"hemispheres" of the legal profession: a corporate client hemi-
sphere and a personal client hemisphere. We summarize our find-
ings as follows:
The two sectors of the legal profession thus include differ-
ent lawyers, with different social origins, who were trained at
different law schools, serve different sorts of clients, practice
in different office environments, are differentially likely to en-
gage in litigation, litigate (when and if they litigate) in differ-
ent forums, have somewhat different values, associate with
different circles of acquaintance, and rest their claims to pro-
fessionalism on different sorts of social power.. .. Only in
the most formal of senses, then, do the two types of lawyers
constitute one profession."1
Of course, the usual rule that lawyers serve one sort of client or the
other, but not both, does not qualify as an iron law. There are
some lawyers who stand astride the equator of the profession, with
one foot in each hemisphere. But, because these lawyers tend not
to be colossi, it is an uncomfortable straddle.
31 See J. Hmz & E. LAUMANN, supra note 11, at 384.
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The division within the profession is reflected in the bar's inter-
nal conflicts on major policy issues. The lines of conflict do not
always mirror exactly the split between the two hemispheres of the
profession, but lawyers representing corporations often are found
in opposition to the lawyers who represent persons. For example,
Watson and Downing found in their study of the politics of judicial
selection in Missouri that, when a so-called "merit selection" sys-
tem was adopted instead of the popular election of judges, electo-
ral politics were replaced by "bar politics" in which the chief an-
tagonists were the "plaintiffs' bar" versus the "defense bar"-that
is, lawyers representing the persons who are the plaintiffs in per-
sonal injury cases were regularly opposed by lawyers representing
the insurance companies that are usually the defendants in such
actions.2 And anyone who has observed the bar in recent years
will be aware of the heated controversies over lawyer advertising,
"no fault" in automobile accidents and in divorce, and rules for the
certification of class actions, all of them issues that have tended to
align lawyers who represent large corporations in opposition to
those who represent persons and small businesses.
But, for the most part, the hemispheres of the bar have little
need to come into conflict or even to intrude upon the conscious-
ness of each other. They move in different social circles, they prac-
tice in different forums, and they seldom touch one another. Be-
cause of this separation, the bar is probably not likely to divide or
disintegrate further. So long as each of the hemispheres minds its
own business and does not go out of its way to interfere with the
other, the two will have little contact and thus will be able to coex-
ist peacefully. For this reason, I do not expect the major divide
within the bar to be formalized by a split into two separate profes-
sions.s There is simply insufficient incentive for the formal split.
Does the existence of a de facto separation of the urban bar into
two hemispheres diminish the power of the profession as a collec-
tivity? Almost certainly. There are signs of erosion or reversals in
the bar's "professional project," especially in the efforts to control
32 See R. WATSON & R. DOWNING, THE POLITICS OF THE BENCH AND BAR: JUDICIAL SELEC-
TION UNDER THE Missoum NONPARTISAN COURT PLAN 259-62 (1969).
3 A similar separation into two distinct occupations was recommended in a report to the
Carnegie Commission in 1920, but the split was never a serious possibility. See A. REED,
TRAINING FOR THE PUBLIC PROFESSION OF THE LAW 237-39, 419 (1921).
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the supply of legal services and the rules governing the practice of
law. In recent years, there has been an unprecedented increase in
the number of lawyers. The existing law schools greatly expanded
their enrollments, new law schools came into being, and bar exam-
iners admitted to practice most of the resulting flood of new grad-
uates. This increase in the supply of lawyers would surely be ex-
pected to have the effect of depressing the price of legal services,
but the profession appears to have been either unwilling or unable
to control the influx of lawyers. Moreover, recent court decisions
have severely restricted the profession's control in such areas as fee
schedules 4 and the rules governing lawyer advertising.3 5 While it is
true that these limitations have been imposed by the courts, espe-
cially by the United States Supreme Court, the courts might not
have acted as they have if there had been a clear consensus within
the bar on these issues.3"
The principal impact, if any, of each of these three recent
changes-i.e., in the supply of lawyers, in fee schedules, and in
lawyer advertising-would fall upon the personal client sector of
practice. It is here that the numbers of new lawyers would be felt
most and would be expected to have the greatest effect on the
price of legal services; bar association fee schedules were always
irrelevant to lawyers in corporate practice; and the rules governing
advertising by lawyers similarly were of little consequence in the
corporate sector. Thus, on each of those issues, the segment of the
bar that might expect to be hurt by the change was the personal
client hemisphere; and, on each issue, the lawyers who serve corpo-
rate clients and the bar associations controlled by corporate law-
yers were either indifferent or adopted positions favoring the
change. If the corporate lawyers had supported the personal client
lawyers, the resolution of these issues might have been different.
But the organized bar also includes substantial representation of
lawyers from smaller communities and smaller firms. In the recent
A' See Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
35 See Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
See M. Powell, Developments in the Regulation of Lawyers Intra- and Extra-Profes-
sional Controls (Aug. 1981) (unpublished manuscript) (presented at the Am. Sociological
Ass'n annual meeting, Toronto, Canada); M. Powell, Professional Self-Regulation The
Transfer of Control from a Professional Association to an Independent Commission (1976)
(unpublished manuscript) (presented at the Am. Sociological Ass'n annual meeting, New
York, New York).
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meeting of the ABA's House of Delegates in New Orleans, it was
principally the representatives of such constituencies who defeated
proposed changes in the Code of Professional Responsibility (the
"Kutak Commission" recommendations) that would have created
new exceptions to the rule of confidentiality in the lawyer-client
relationship. 7 There is some real competition between the two ma-
jor segments of the legal profession for power within the organized
bar and for control of its governing bodies. The resulting balance
of power within most bar associations has meant that they devote
much of their energy to engaging in "symbolic politics." More deci-
sive action-action that would produce clear winners and
losers-is usually blocked. 8
Turning to another aspect of the power of the legal profession
considered as a collectivity, we might note that Laumann and I
found that the composition of the Chicago bar is becoming no less
exclusive or socially elite, in terms of the socioeconomic class ori-
gins of the lawyers. Indeed, our finding was that younger lawyers
come from privileged family backgrounds in even greater dispro-
portion than do older lawyers. Of Chicago practitioners who were
admitted to the bar before 1960, sixty-eight percent had fathers
who were employed in "professional, technical or managerial" oc-
cupations, while thirty-two percent had fathers employed in occu-
pations of lower socioeconomic status. For those admitted to prac-
tice in 1960 or later, seventy-eight percent had fathers in
professional, technical, or managerial occupations, and only
twenty-two percent had fathers employed in less prestigious and
remunerative occupations. Thus, among the younger lawyers the
proportion drawn from less privileged socioeconomic origins de-
creased by a full ten percent.3 9 If one of the objectives of the "pro-
fessional project" is to enhance the social prestige of the profession
by recruiting its personnel from the most elite social origins, the
split in the profession between the corporate and personal client
lawyers would not appear to be inhibiting the achievement of that
objective. But is social exclusivity, in this sense, really any part of
37 See Taylor, Lawyers Vote Against Disclosure of Fraudulent Activity by Clients, N.Y.
Times, Feb. 8, 1983, at 1, cols. 2-3.
See Heinz, Laumann, Cappell, Halliday & Schaalman, Diversity, Representation and
Leadership in an Urban Bar: A First Report on a Survey of the Chicago Bar, 1976 Am. B.
FOUND. RESEARCH J. 717.
" See J. Hmz & E. LAUMANN, supra note 11, at 190-91.
908 [Vol. 17:891
POWER OF LAWYERS
the goals of the leadership of the profession? I very much doubt it.
Indeed, the leadership of the ABA and of other bar associations in
recent years has supported affirmative action in law school admis-
sions, higher levels of law school scholarship aid, and other mea-
sures designed to overcome socioeconomic barriers to entry into
the profession. I do not believe that these actions have been a
sham or have been intended as mere palliatives, even though they
may in fact have had little effect. It is hard to imagine that most
lawyers can really care very much whether their fellow members of
the bar were reared in upper or upper-middle class homes, but that
is, indeed, where most of them were reared.
It is also true that the limits that social background imposes on
career opportunitites do not cease upon entry into the profession,
but have effects on the career paths that are open to lawyers after
admission to the bar. One of the most striking and perhaps sur-
prising of our Chicago findings is the degree to which the ethno-
religious backgrounds of lawyers appear to determine the fields in
which they specialize.40 In a "learned profession," where arcane
knowledge and professional skills are supposed to be what matters,
one might not expect the social origins of the lawyers to have much
effect on the sorts of work that they do. But Laumann and I found,
for example, that Chicago lawyers who are Roman Catholics were
three times more likely to be prosecutors than were either Protes-
tants or Jews. Jews were more than twice as likely as Catholics to
do divorce work, and Jews were incalculably more likely to handle
divorces than were lawyers who were Episcopalians, Presbyterians,
or Congregationalists-in our sample of 777 Chicago lawyers, we
found no one from those Protestant denominations who did a large
amount of divorce work.41 What sort of legal work did the Protes-
tants do? We found that Episcopalians, Presbyterians, and Con-
gregationalists were five times more likely than either Catholics or
40 See J. HmNz & E. LAumANN, supra note 11, at 64-76, 182-206; Heinz & Laumann, The
Legal Profession: Client Interests, Professional Roles, and Social Hierarchies, 76 lica. L
RIv. 1111 (1978).
41 See J. HINz & E. LA UmANN, supra note 11, at 331-32. The figures are based on calcula-
tions concerning lawyers who devoted 25% or more of their working time to each of these
specialities or fields of legal work. The inclusion of practitioners who devoted smaller per-
centages of their time would probably result in greater ethnic heterogeneity in the field
categories, while the use of a higher time percentage would probably produce an even more
homogeneous set of practitioners within each field.
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Jews to practice securities law or to do antitrust defense work.
These examples are merely illustrative, of course, and I should
caution you that we had only relatively small numbers of respon-
dents in some of these categories, but the examples will serve to
give an idea of the flavor of our findings (a bitter flavor, to my
taste).
If the bar itself is not seeking to bring about this sorting and
channeling of lawyers by their social origins, then why does it oc-
cur? What produces it? The late Everett Hughes suggested one
possible answer when he characterized some lawyers as the "utter
captives and choreboys of their clients." That phrase-which has
been quoted often, mostly out of context-occurs in the course of a
discussion of the extent to which Chicago solo practitioners are
constrained in choosing their cases or lines of work:
Lawyers who practice alone-at least a sample of them taken
in Chicago-are utter captives and choreboys of their clients.
They have no freedom to choose a branch of law and make
themselves expert or learned in it. Most of them, in time, do
find their practice narrowed to a special line of chores: they
have become specialists by default.42
Our more recent Chicago findings continue to support Hughes' ob-
servation. But perhaps Hughes' proposition is too simple-or, at
least, too short. No doubt lawyers respond in large measure to cli-
ent demands, but just how do client interests come to determine
the social types of the lawyers that serve them? The principal de-
terminants, I believe, might be labelled prejudice and propinquity.
Part of the reason that the bonds of ethnicity and religious back-
ground have an effect on lawyer-client relationships is that social
background provides a recognized or perceived basis for mutual
trust. Within many ethnic communities, people who share the eth-
nic identity are seen as also sharing a common set of values and a
common base of experience. People who look like, act like, and talk
like me are more likely to be perceived as sympathetic to my inter-
ests and as trustworthy with my confidences. This applies to law-
" Hughes, The Professions in Society, 26 CAN. J. ECON. & POL. Sci. 54, 60-61 (1960). In
this passage, Hughes was referring to the dissertation research of his student, Jerome Car-
lin. Carlin's dissertation was later published. See J. CARLIN, LAWYERS ON THEIR OWN: A
STUDY OF INDIVIDUAL PRACTITIONERS IN CHICAGO (1962).
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yers. And it applies not only in the personal client hemisphere, but
in the corporate hemisphere as well The social organization of net-
works of acquaintance serves tb structure the patterns of referral
of clients to lawyers and of lawyers to clients, and those social net-
works often follow ethnoreligious lines. Again, this may apply not
only in the neighborhoods, but in the world of corporate enter-
prise. Ethnic patterns in the organization of business activity are
reflected in the relationships of such clients to their lawyers. The
social stratification of the bar thus corresponds closely to the strat-
ification of the broader society within which the lawyers work.
What does all this have to do with the power of lawyers? Just
this: it suggests that the norms that govern the legal profes-
sion-that organize the social structure of the profession, that de-
termine which lawyers will serve which clients, and that define who
gets what legal services-come from without rather than from
within the bar. The legal profession, viewed either as a collectivity
or as a set of individuals and firms, appears to lack the power nec-
essary to establish and enforce its own norms. The profession may,
perhaps, even be unable to define or identify those norms. It may
not know what they are.
If the issue of professional autonomy is an issue of who calls the
shots, then my observations imply that lawyers are not really call-
ing the shots very often in our society. I, for one, am not at all sure
that that is a bad thing. Pending further, more satisfactory re-
search, however, I conclude that the prestige of the legal profes-
sion, the influence of lawyers on their clients, and the collective
political action of lawyers do not often bring about an allocation of
the society's scarce resources that differs in any substantial way
from the distribution that would have been willed by the lawyers'
clients or by the polity apart from that prestige, influence, or ac-
tion. Not often at all.
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